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Strategic Choice and Industrial Relations
Theory and Practice
Thomas A. Kochan, Robert B. McKersie and Peter Cappelli
Industrial relations in the private sector of the American
economy has been changing in a number of important ways in recent
years, most visibly in collective bargaining where we have seen
important wage, benefit, work practice, and employment security
concessions and tradeoffs negotiated in a number of major industries
(Cappelli and McKersie, 1983). However, other important changes have
been occuring more quietly and more incrementally over a longer
period of time at the workplace level, where new forms of employee
participation and alternative forms of work organization have
evolved, and at the highest levels of managerial decision-making
where corporate business decisions are made and basic policies
regarding human resources, technology and the status of unions are
formulated (Kochan and Cappelli, 1983). Unfortunately, our theories
for explaining and understanding these changes are not yet well
developed.
Indeed, these changes appear to be important enough to warrant
examining the basic paradigm that has governed industrial relations
research in recent years, a conclusion echoed in recent commentaries
by Derber, Strauss, Kerr, and Cummings (1982). The common theme
linking these arguments is that most of the currently popular
theories of industrial relations and the empirical evidence
supporting them were generated during periods of relative stability
in U.S. collective bargaining and industrial relations and
consequently are too static in nature. Thus, they have difficulty
explaining the behavior of the system when its basic parameters
appear to be changing. The purpose of this paper is to attempt to
add a more dynamic component to industrial relations theory by
developing the concept of strategy, or strategic choice, in a way
that we believe can help explain some of the changes in industrial
relations that have occurred or are currently unfolding.
The Prevailing Paradigm
The debate over the appropriate theory for industrial relations
can be traced at least to the turn of the century when institutional
economists challenged the usefulness of classical economics as
applied to the employment relationship (cf Dorfman 1949, Kochan
1980). The pluralist perspective that emerged from these challenges
recognized the conflicting but interdependent interests of management
and labor and laid the intellectual foundation for the labor
legislation of the 1930's. Subsequently, Dunlop's Industrial
Relations Systems (1958) provided a broad set of concepts for
thinking about industrial relations issues. Dunlop's organizing
framework for industrial relations began by analyzing the
environment, then moved to consider the characteristics of the actors
and their interactions, and ended with an explanation of the rules
governing employment relationships. And as the logic of
industrialization played itself out over time, alternative systems of
industrial relations were expected to converge toward a common set of
formal arrangements and rules (Kerr, Dunlop, Harbison, and Myers
1960).
In contrast to these efforts to build global theories, research
since the 1960's shifted toward middle range models designed to
explain variations in the process and outcomes of collective
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bargaining. In addition, the theories being used to explain these
concerns have shifted back toward the basic social science
disciplines (Kochan, Mitchell, and Dyer 1982). There are a number of
anomalies in current industrial relations, however, that cannot be
explained with these middle-level theories. Nor can they be easily
reconciled with the systems approach. A brief outline of some of
these unexpected developments will help illustrate the inadequacy of
the current theoretical approaches.
Anomalies in Industrial Relations Systems Theory
(1) The legislation of the 1930's established collective
bargaining as the cornerstone of national labor policy, and it was
assumed that unionism would expand as workers embraced bargaining as
a means of asserting their common interests. Since 1956, however,
private sector unionism has been steadily falling as a percentage of
the labor force (from a peak of 33 percent to around 20 percent or
even less if public sector membership is excluded). Perhaps more
importantly, the growth sectors of the American economy are
increasingly nonunion. Union membership is currently concentrated in
the older industries, the older firms, and the older plants within
those industries. While nationwide estimates are unfortunately not
available, evidence from our case studies suggests that the
differences at the plant level are particularly important. For
example, one of our studies found that the average age of union
plants in one large conglomerate (over 80 U.S. plants) is 44 years as
opposed to 18 years for the nonunion plants (Verma and Kochan 1983).
Further, only one of the plants opened by this firm since the
mid-1960s' has been organized by a union. While it is difficult to
generalize from a single firm, our case studies of other
organizations reveal that this pattern is the norm.
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Various efforts have been made to explain this development, and
they typically look to characteristics of the parties and the
environment for the cause of declining union memberships (e.g., Juris
and Roomkin 1980). These explanations are at best incomplete.
Kochan (1979) and Farber (1983) note, for example, that there is
still a considerable pool of unorganized workers who would prefer to
be in unionized jobs. Farber (1983) estimates that less than half of
the decline in union membership could be attributed to structural
shifts in the economy and the labor force. Analyses by Freeman
(1983) and Dickens and Leonard (1983) reach similar conclusions. The
implication is that something about the behavior of the parties
changed over this time period and must be taken into account in order
to explain this union decline.
(2) Important changes have also occurred in managerial
strategies toward unions and collective bargaining. At no time since
the 1920's has American management found it as socially and
politically acceptable to embrace publicly a "union-free" approach.
In contrast to previous periods, many companies now make union
avoidance or union containment a very high priority. The pluralistic
assumptions of industrial relations researchers which include a
legitimate role for independent worker organizations appear not to be
shared by the majority of American employers. This change in
management's view has coincided with a rearranging of many firms'
industrial relations/human resources function, transferring power
from labor relations staffs to those human resource functions
associated with union avoidance.
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Perhaps the most significant development on the management side
has been the rise of an apparent inconsistency in its relations with
unions at different levels of the firm. It is often the case, for
example, that management representatives in bargaining are
maintaining a status-quo relationship in negotiations (or seeking
plant level concessions) while corporate management follows an
aggressive union avoidance policy with respect to the placement of
new plants. At the same time shopfloor management works to promote
worker involvement and participation sometimes with and sometimes
without active local union cooperation. Contemporary theories have
yet to address this apparent inconsistency.
(3) Along with the general decline in unionization has been
the rise of a variety of experiments, usually at the plant level,
that many argue represent alternatives, or perhaps supplements, to
collective bargaining. These experiments involve various forms of
worker participation (e.g., quality of working life programs and
quality circles) and have been touted as the "New Industrial
Relations" (Business Week, 1981) that will replace adversarial
relations with more cooperative efforts. The rise of these practices
and their variation across industries and firms are not explained by
current theories.
(4) The pattern of collective bargaining outcomes also appears
to have changed in recent years. It has generally been the case
since World War II, for example, that changes in the terms and
conditions of employment occurred steadily and were initiated by
union demands. These improvements were then gradually transferred or
"spilled over" to the nonunion sector. Increasingly, however,
management has been taking the initiative in bargaining demands and
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in introducing innovations in personnel practices in nonunion
employment. In many cases, the introduction of new benefits, new
forms of work organization; and a stronger commitment to employment
continuity (Foulkes, 1980; Walton, 1981; Dyer, Foltman, and
Milkovich, 1983) in nonunion firms appear to go beyond the simple
goal of matching union gains in order to keep unions out. Further,
the changes in contracts secured through collective bargaining now
are often initiated by management demands which result in a sharp
worsening of the terms and conditions of employment. These changes
are associated with concession bargaining, and while environmental
changes have contributed to the concession experience, at least some
of the pressures appear to be independent of changes in the external
environment-(Cappelli 1983).
(5) The traditional role of government as a regulator of the
process of rule setting, but not of the outcomes, has changed
dramatically since the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935. The period
between 1960 and 1980 was one of rapid expansion of government
regulations of the terms and conditions of employment governing
industrial relations. The inauguration of the Reagan Administration
marked a sharp reversal in that approach and to some extent in
government's role as a neutral in regulating the process of
bargaining (Wanger and Klein 1983). These changes in government
policy suggest the need for a reassessment of the government's role
in the U.S. industrial relations system. (See the paper by Benjamin
Aaron in this issue for further analysis of these developments).
The Challenge at Hand
Understanding these developments represents a major challenge
facing the community of industrial relations scholars. We are not at
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a stage where we can specify all of the elements of a theory that
would explain satisfactorily these significant changes. We can
indicate how the framework for thinking about industrial relations
can be expanded and the role that strategic choice can play within
this more complex paradigm.-/
We believe that a more realistic model of industrial relations
should recognize first the active role played by management in
shaping industrial relations (as opposed to the traditional, reactive
view responding to union pressures) and second the different levels
of decisionmaking that occur within business labor, and government
organizations and their independent effects on industrial relations
outcomes. This is why we believe the concept of strategy, or
strategic choice, can help add a more dynamic component to systems
theory and in so doing help explain some of the evolving developments
in U.S. industrial relations.
One major difficulty with existing systems theory lies in its
view that a shared ideology perpetuates the system. It is argued
that the process of setting rules produces experts on both sides
whose common experiences and interaction lead to shared
understandings. This approach focusses on events at the bargaining
level and therefore fails to recognize that important decisions are
made also at other levels.
./ The changes in theory that we will advocate are consistent with
the process of paradigm shifts that occur from time to time in all
scientific fields. Thomas Kuhn (1970) has argued that throughout
history, the development of research paradigms within academic fields
has generally been a conservative process where researchers extend
successful techniques and arguments to related questions in the
field. At some point, however, anomalies accumulate which cannot be
explained by the current approaches. The research paradigm -- the
accepted way of addressing problems in the field -- then changes
because the old approach is unable to explain these accumulating
anomalies. We believe that the Kuhn perspective is applicable to the
current situation in industrial relations.
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This is particularly so for management decision making. For
example, even though the labor relations staff may share with union
leaders a commitment to the process of collective bargaining, higher
level corporate executives may not. At the time that Industrial
Relations Systems was written, the firm was modeled as an extension
of the entrepreneur where interests and decisionmaking were unified.
Contemporary research has recognized the complex nature of firms
where interests may vary both horizontally and vertically within the
organization (Chamberlain and Kuhn, 1965; Walton and McKersie, 1965;
Kochan, Cummings and Huber, 1976; Bacharach and Lawler, 1981).2
In passing, we should note that we are presenting neither a
complete new theory of industrial relations, nor totally rejecting
the systems' framework. Instead our purpose is to increase our
understanding of the role played by strategic choices of the actors
(particularly employers in recent years) as a concommitant influence
with environmental forces and historical patterns of development.
Nor do we contend that earlier industrial relations researchers
totally ignored strategy as an important theoretical concept.
Indeed, many of those writing prior to the 1930's and shortly after
the New Deal were trying to understand and instruct management and
labor on how to establish effective bargaining relationships. It was
after the principles and basic structures of collective bargaining
z/ The diversity of interests within management organizations and
the complexity of their decisionmaking has long been recognized by
industrial relations and is increasingly being accepted by the social
sciences. Our concern here, however, is more with the consequences
of that decisionmaking than the process per se. For a discussion of
how changes in the process of decision making both reflect and cause
a decline in the power of labor relations professionals within
management see Kochan and Cappelli (forthcoming, 1984).
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became established that our attention turned away from the more
discretionary models and relied more heavily on the influence of
3/
environmental pressures.-
The Concept of Strategic Choice
Strategic choice is a term used with increasing regularity in
both economics and organizational research. An entire research field
has grown out of Chandler's (1962) research on the relationship
between strategy and structure, for example, and both industrial
organization economists (Bain 1968, Porter 1980) and theorists of
administrative behavior (Simon 1957, Braybrooke and Lindblom 1970,
Cyert and March 1963) have sought to integrate the role of strategic
choice into their models.
Various definitions of strategy have been offered in the
literatures noted above. Rumelt (1979; 197) describes some of the
different approaches:
The term 'strategy' has a range of related meanings and authors
have generally felt quite free to use it quite idiosyncrat-
ically. For game theorists, strategies are concrete actions or
rules for choosing actions in a conflict situation; for some
strategy is 'high level' or 'long term' planning, while others
see it as referring only to broad guage issues of 'mission'.
3/ Contrast, for example, the perspective of Harbison and Coleman
in Goals and Strategies in Collective Bargaining (1951) in which
choice e.g., accepting the reality of unions and collective
bargaining and working towards positive labor-management
relationships versus the volume edited by Somers Contemporary
Collective Bargaining (1980) that uses a systems framework to examine
the nature of industrial relations on an industry-by-industry basis.
The Somers symposium concerns itself with the well established
categories of bargaining structure, strikes and bargaining outcomes,
to mention just a few. Considerably less emphasis is given to the
fact that many private sector companies were moving steadily in the
union-free direction. The existing paradigm did not envision the
possibility that key decisions were being made by management at a
level above collective bargaining and that these decisions would
ultimately undermine the stability of many labor-management
relationships.
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Still others use it to denote any decision that is
'important'. The concept of strategy....that has come to play
an important role in the study of organizational guidance
[consulting] contains elements of all of the above notions.
Its special focus, however, is on the relationship between a
whole organizaton and its external environment.
The applicability to industrial relations of these approaches
to strategy is limited by two problems. First, most research on
strategy uses the firm as the point of reference while the pluralist
framework associated with industrial relations places equal emphasis
on the interests and roles of unions and the government. Thus the
strategic choices of each of these actors, and their
interrelationships, must play a central role in industrial relations
theory. Second, most of this literature focuses on the process of
forming strategy rather than the actual content or outcomes
associated with strategies. While we are not uninterested in the
process of strategy formulation, a complete industrial relations
theory should be capable of relating both the process and content of
strategy making to the goal attainment of the various actors.
Our approach to strategic choice in industrial relations is
further defined by two conditions. First, strategic decisions can
only occur where the parties have discretion over their decisions,
that is, where environmental constraints do not overpower the ability
of the parties to choose alternative courses of action. Discretion
exists in part because the goals of the parties are not always
clearly defined or change over time. This is particularly so for
unions whose goals reflect those of a changing membership, but it is
also the case for management confronting specific business decisions
such as the products and markets that it should pursue. Even where
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these goals are stable and clear, discretion exists because there may
be alternative strategies for pursuing those goals.-/ Second,
within the set of decisions where the parties have discretion,
strategic decisions are those that alter the party's role or its
relationship with other actors in the industrial relations system.
The effect of this second condition is to eliminate from the
definition those minor or trivial decisions over which the parties
have discretion. It is important to note that the effects of these
strategic choices on industrial relations may only be evident over
the long run and may appear only indirectly and may not even be the
result of a consciously articulated or preconceived plan (Weick,
1979; March and Olsen, 1976).
Our argument is that the indentification of the strategic
choices made by the parties will help to complete the systems
framework and to explain many of the anomalies noted above. The
diagram in Figure 1 illustrates the locations where strategic
decisionmaking occurs. The columns of the matrix represent the three
key actors who make strategic decisions - employers, labor
organizations, and the government. The rows represent the levels at
which these decisions are made. The effects of these decisions,
however, may appear at levels other than those where the decisions
were made.
Strategic choices in the bottom row are those associated with
workers as individuals or work groups and their relations with the
work environment. They include the design of work organization and
work rules, the actions of supervisors and shop stewards in workplace
/I Hall (1982) and Caves and Pugel (1980) cite examples of firms
in the same industries who pursue widely different strategies toward
their common markets.
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;,ktng and interactions, and public policies governing individual
, at the workplace such as occupational safety and health or
yployment opportunity laws. Strategic choices in the middle
je¢ the familiar ones associated with the practice of collective
zing, and the implementation of personnel policy. Decisions at
.? tier represent to some extent a new frontier in industrial
.ons research. Many of the choices at this global level are
:amiliar to European systems where, for example, tripartite
ations between the government and union and employer
.ations (e.g., Sweden and Austria) are common over industrial
,ons issues. The tradition of business unionism may make the
ell more or less empty in the U.S., however, this too may be
nag in situations where unions are now pressing for a more
:gful role in management decisions regarding investment, union
:Iation, introduction of new technology, controls over
rcing or subcontracting, and the design of work organization
8s in new plants. One could also see changing government
e8 toward union organizing as representing key strategic
Ons by government. Business decisions usually thought of as
-ate prerogatives -- which markets to pursue, where to locate
i. and whether to make or buy components - would fill the
-"nt cell.
't would be extremely time-consuming to enumerate all the
> strategic choices that could fit in each of these cells, and
of them would be relevant for a given system at a particular
r, time. We believe that at present the most important of
'rategic choices have been those made by management,
Rlarly those associated with the top tier of the framework.
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Indeed, we believe that it is largely the strategic decisions of
management that have initiated the process of fundamental change in
the parameters of the system. Thus in the remainder of this paper we
will focus on managerial decisions in this top tier and leave
analyses of choices made by other actors and at other levels of the
system to a future time.
In focussing on the role of management decisionmaking in
industrial relations, we join a growing trend in U.K. research
(Purcell, 1981; Gospel and Littler, 1982; Winchester, 1983; Purcell,
1983; Sisson, 1983). But while the British literature concentrates
on strategic decisions at the bargaining level, our concern is with
all three levels of the system.
Markets, Business Strategies, and Industrial Relations
Shifts in business strategies are both affected by the current
state of industrial relations and in turn affect future industrial
relations outcomes at all three levels of the firm. The key to
understanding the dynamics of an industrial relations system during
periods of significant change in product markets lies in
understanding how market shifts interact with business strategies and
prior or current states of industrial relations. Several
propositions are outlined below to illustrate the types of
interactions we have in mind.
Changes in the competitive environment can occur gradually as
products change in response to changing consumer demand (e.g., the
shift to small cars)or as low-cost competition grows. The
environment can also change abruptly because of competitive shocks
such as the deregulation of the trucking or airline industries or the
introduction of new products (radial tires) and technologies (direct
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casting). Regardless of the cause, a sharp increase in competitive
pressures forces firms to make a series of decisions whose effects
reverberate through the organization and its industrial relations
system.
The sequence of decisions set in motion by an increase in
product market competition are illustrated in flow chart form in
Figure 2. First, the firm must reassess its commitment to the line
of business it has been in and decide whether it wants to attempt to
compete in the new environment or to withdraw and reallocate its
capital resources elsewhere. Second, if the firm chooses to remain
active in the market, adjustments in its competitive strategy may be
needed. The major strategic decision for firms who remain in their
more competitive market is whether to compete on the basis of low
prices and high volume or to seek out specialized market niches where
a price premium can be supported (Hall 1982). The evolution from a
growth to a mature product market, for example, typically forces
firms to be more competitive with respect to prices. This leads them
to shift their emphasis in industrial relations away from maintaining
labor peace in order to maximize production to one of controlling
labor costs, streamlining work rules, and increasing productivity in
order to meet growing price competition (Slichter, 1941; Livernash,
1962; McKersie and Hunter, 1973; and Kochan and Katz, 1983). The
pressure to control or lower labor costs is especially intense if a
firm decides to attempt to compete across all segments of its product
market on the basis of low prices.
Third, the strategic choices made by firms that remain in the
market require them to rearrange their capital in order to take
advantage of new profit opportunities. This process has been
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described by Schumpeter (1950) as the creative destruction of
capital. One aspect of this rearrangement which has clear
implications for industrial relations is the choice of production
technology (e.g., degree of automation, the mix of required job
skills and the level of control dictated by the technology). Another
choice is whether to reinvest in existing facilities or to reallocate
resources to new locations such as "greenfield" sites. This decision
is influenced by the state of industrial relations in existing plants
and by the potential situation at alternative sites. As will be
illustrated below, management can use this choice to alter the
pattern of union organization within the firm and to change the
process of collective bargaining.
Related to the decision about the direction of investment is
the decision concerning the speed of capital movements (Bluestone
and Harrison, 1982). Some companies opt for a rapid shift, with a
wholesale termination of old facilities in favor of new locations.
Others shift capital more gradually and may match the rundown of
financial resources to the attrition of human resources (McKersie and
Klein, 1983; Verma, 1983).
Finally, changes in business strategy and their related
production decisions affect the viability of existing organizational
structures, particularly, the extent of vertical integration. The
firm may reconsider which components of the final product it should
make and which it should buy (Williamson 1975). Components that were
produced internally may now be available at lower cost from new
producers operating with more sophisticated technology and perhaps
lower labor costs. The decision to "outsource" components to
subcontractors has clear consequences for the existing workforce and
for industrial relations.
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While these business strategy decisions are typically made
unilaterally by management, they are influenced by the history and
current state of industrial relations in the firm and the industry.
Indeed, it is important to consider not only the firm's own situation
(the cost and predictability of its labor supply) but also the
relationship between its industrial relations and the industrial
relations characteristics of its competitors. The most important
consideration here is whether wages and labor costs have been taken
out of competition (Commons, 1919). Specifically, the motivation to
alter either existing collective bargaining outcomes or to avoid
unions altogether is in part a function of the degree to which the
parties have been able to take labor costs out of competition. The
ability of firms to pursue nonunion options is, in turn, inversely
related to the current level of unionization in the firm and is
directly related to the extent to which collective bargaining is
decentralized.
Firm Level Examples
We will now attempt to illustrate the explanatory power of
these propositions by reviewing how several firms have adjusted to
shifts in their competitive environments given differences in their
industrial relations histories and current situations.
Adjustments in Decentralized/Low Union Environments
In firms where union coverage is low or where bargaining is
decentralized, it is difficult for unions to confront management at a
high enough level to influence the process of corporate
decisionmaking. These are common features of many collective
bargaining relationships in the U.S. manufacturing and service
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sectors. In these situations one often finds management adjusting to
a more competitive environment in ways that undercut the union's
position. Perhaps the most important method for doing so has been to
shift production capacity away from unionized operations. An
executive at one major chemical company, for example, noted that
while relations with established unions had not been antagonistic,
the company was nevertheless moving actively down the road toward
nonunion status. This change resulted from new sites being started
and continued on a nonunion basis while independent and international
union sites, most of which were older and manufactured more mature
products, underwent attrition. In addition, the company also made
efforts to ensure that bargaining at the remaining unionized plants
remained decentralized and therefore did not impinge on the company's
corporate decisionmaking.
This experience parallels many other diversified firms that
expanded through either opening new plants or through acquisitions
since 1960 (Verma and Kochan, 1983). The move to establish competing
plants (often referred to as satellite or sister plants) brought
advantages to these firms both in union avoidance and in reducing the
leverage of existing unions in bargaining by providing an alternative
source of supply during a strike. The recent era of increased
competitive pressure has accelerated the movement of investments and
jobs to nonunion plants as illustrated by the following summary that
Cooper Industries, a large diversified manufacturing firm provided in
a meeting with stock analysts (Kidder-Peabody, 1983; 3):
Approximately 50% of Cooper's workforce is
unionized but the percentage has been declining as.
Cooper has relocated facilities from high-to-low
labor cost areas. Cooper strives to provide wage
rates that are competitive in the community in which
-17-
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the plant is located, but these rates must also be
competitive within the industry. Where the latter
criterion is not possible and the union is
unaccommodating, Cooper will relocate the plant. In
the past 15 years, 18 plants have been relocated
from high-to-low labor cost areas, with another six
moves in progress. Of the 18 plants already
relocated, 15 of the newly opened plants are
nonunion.
The links across decentralized bargaining, plant location
decisions, union avoidance and a low cost competitive strategy are
even more vivid in the case of Emerson Electric as noted in the
following excerpt from Business Week (1983;61).
Several of [the previous president of Emerson]
legacies remain integral elements of Emerson's
philosophy. He pioneered the company's 'Southern
strategy,' pushing its manufacturing out of highly
unionized St. Louis into small plants scattered
across the South. Today, most of the company's 116
plants (average size: 150 employees) are located in
the mid-South. The company, which ties 10% of its
division managers' bonuses to keeping plants
union-free, has proven unusually adept at this
practice: It has lost just one of 34 organizing
campaigns over the past decade. Today Emerson's
wage costs are 17% less than General Electic Co.'s.
These examples illustrate the dynamics of a decentralized
industrial relations system operating in firms that diversify,
emphasize low labor costs, and follow a union avoidance strategy.
The changing patterns of industrial relations found at General
Electric further amplify the evolution of this pattern over an
extended period of time.
From the late 1930s until the end of World War II, General
Electric sought to develop cooperative relationships at the plant
level with the local unions representing its employees. This was
consistent with its broader strategy of decentralizing management to
the division level. This decentralizing strategy continued through
the growth and diversification stages the corporation experienced
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during the period 1950-70 and carried through various shifts in
G.E.'s labor relations strategy before, during, and after the
"Boulwarism" period. This decentralizing strategy allowed the firm
to open new plants on a non-union basis. Even though the various
unions representing G.E. workers were successful in centralizing
negotiations through coordinated bargaining, a substantial fraction
of G.E.'s capacity was not included. More significantly, the unions
were never successful in either organizing the newly opened plants
nor in obtaining a "neutrality" or other voluntary recognition
agreement with G.E. at the corporate level. As a result, the
percentage of production workers under union contract has fallen
steadily (although the exact numbers are not available, the number of
G.E. workers belonging to the International Union of Electrical
Workers [IUE] has declined from a peak of 80,000 to 54,000 in the
past two decades.)
Adjustments in Centralized Structures/Highly Unionized Environments
Unions are more likely to influence the process of strategic
decision making in firms that are highly unionized and where
bargaining is centralized. For example, a major realignment of
industrial relations occurred in the trucking and airline industries,
as existing firms adjusted to the competitive shocks introduced by
deregulation and the entrance of new and smaller competitiors. Both
of these industries had been characterized by high levels of
unionization and centralized bargaining. In trucking, the National
Master Freight Agreement, covering most major over-the-road unionized
carriers, provided the centralization, while in airlines, it was the
effect of pattern bargaining across the major carriers by a few
dominant unions and the existence of a mutual aid pact that provided
-19-
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the stability prior to deregulation (Northrup, 1983). In the
aftermath of deregulation, both industries have experienced an influx
of new specialized firms competing for parts of the market on the
basis of lower costs and non-union status. The nationwide character
of collective bargaining agreements prevented existing carriers from
simply moving their operations to nonunion sites as some
manufacturers have done.5/
Another arrangement for reducing labor costs was concession
bargaining which was pursued on both wages and work rules by nearly
all of the unionized firms in airlines and trucking. In addition,
many carriers in both industries attempted to establish non-union
subsidiaries to compete against the new entrants. The net result was
a general industry-wide scramble to lower labor costs with the
specific focus of the cost reduction effort varying depending on
the extent to which the firm attempted to compete directly in the
markets being overtaken by the new nonunion firms. In the trucking
industry, the.Teamsters represent virtually all unionized employees,
and they were able to use this centralized position to secure
5/ The degree to which capital decisions are location-bound exerts
an important intervening influence between business strategies and
industrial relations options. In some industries, assets are quite
"fixed" and reinvestment or new investment must be made at existing
sites. The steel industry is an important case in point. A steel
company can choose to shift investment (e.g. U.S. Steel buying
Marathon Oil) but it cannot open a greenfield site very easily as a
way of dealing with high labor costs. Over time as the economic
environment changes and the sluggishness of the centralized, highly
unionized structure to adapt produces a widening of the competitive
gap, new business options start to emerge. In the steel industry
these new options took the form of: (1) deintegrating production
(e.g. importing slabs and modernizing the finishing mills) and (2)
downsizing (mini mills with electric furnaces and direct casting).
This latter innovation has been pioneered primarily by new companies
that have operated on a non union basis.
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limitations on double-breasted operations as part of the nationwide
Master Freight agreement. There is no equivalent centralization of
union power or of bargaining in the airlines, however, and only in a
few instances have the airline unions been able to secure the same
tradeoff.
While the source of economic pressure has been different, the
auto industry also has experienced severe shocks. The difference
between the auto industry and the previous examples, however, is that
the United Auto Workers (UAW) position in the industry has been
strong enough to influence many of the corporate decisions that might
otherwise have undercut its position. In the face of significant
increases in competition from imports in the past decade, the three
major U.S. auto firms each decided to continue competing across the
full spectrum of the product market. However, the growth in imports
meant that not only were labor costs no longer taken out of
competition, labor costs became one of the vital sources of
competition with the Japanese. Since the UAW represents all
production workers of these firms and has negotiated agreements which
grant voluntary recognition to the union in any new auto plants
opened, the companies were not able to shift capacity to non-union
plants.6--/ The companies still had the ability to outsource,
however, but the union was able to force auto management to negotiate
over that option and prevent it from being used to further undercut
the union's position.
6_/ Significantly, General Motors attempted during the early 1970's
to keep a number of new plants unorganized under a program that has
come to be called the "Southern Strategy" but the UAW responded to
the challenge and possessed the bargaining power to compel General
Motors to agree to an accretion clause providing automatic
recognition to the UAW at all new GM auto plants.
-21-
This constellation of product market changes, business
strategies, and industrial relations characteristics produced the
following adjustments in autos since 1980: (1) concession bargaining
on wages and fringe benefits in return for more significant
involvement of union representatives in corporate decision-making
through such arrangements as mutual growth forums to share
information at GM and Ford, and formal representation on the Board of
Directors at Chrysler; (2) various joint efforts to stabilize
employment through limits on outsourcing and experimentation with
plant level "pilot employment guarantees;" (3) major investments in
new technology for both existing and new plants, and; (4) renewed and
expanded QWL processes at the workplace that are focused on product
quality and productivity improvements, work redesign and
reorganization, and cost reduction.
The auto industry illustrates how the search for lower cost
options in a highly unionized environment can produce a broadening of
the bargaining agenda and new forms of union-management interactions
at both the workplace and at the level of corporate strategy. The
key factor producing these results, however, was the ability of the
union to prevent certain strategic choices and to influence the
7/
process of corporate decisionmaking.-
_ Our use of the automobile industry example treats business
strategy as being uniform across the major companies. We know,
however, that this is not the case. For example, Ford Motor's
response to product market changes has resulted in more cooperative
labor-management relations (what the parties call the new
partnership) than General Motors'. Whether this difference stems
from differences in personalities, corporate history or economic
circumstances (e.g. Ford purchases approximately 50% of its
components from sub contractors compared to approximately 30% at
General Motors and consequently Ford has the flexibility to pull work
back in house to meet employment assurances) we are not in a position
to say. Futher discussion of recent developments in labor relations
in autos is found in Katz (1982).
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The experience of Xerox Corporation reflects a situation where
a change in the competitive environment has combined with a history
of cooperative labor relations to produce innovative strategies for
confronting the competition. Xerox has been prominently featured in
the business press in recent years as a prime example of a firm
moving from a growth to a mature and more highly competitive market
for its main line of business, office copiers. Between 1970 and 1981
Xerox's share of the office copier market fell from 96% to 46%
(Business Week, 1981). In adjusting.to this new competitive
environment in the early 1980s, Xerox decided to: (1) remain active
in all segments of the copier market (as well as to diversify into
other office automation markets); (2) shift its competitive strategy
from being a price leader to competing on the basis of price, and;
(3) significantly reduce its manufacturing costs by reducing its blue
and white collar labor forces and taking other steps to reduce labor
costs and increase manufacturing productivity.
Production workers at Xerox (in their major manufacturing
facilities in Rochester, New York as well as in other small units
scattered.about the country) are represented by the Amalgamated
Clothing and Textile Workers Union. The union and the company have
enjoyed a long history of labor-management cooperation dating back to
the voluntary recognition of the union by the company in the 1940s.
Bargaining is carried out on a relatively centralized basis by
setting the basic pattern in Rochester and then applying it to the
other facilities. Union leaders have access to top corporate
decision makers both indirectly through the corporate director of
industrial relations and directly through periodic meetings with top
-23-
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corporate executives. In 1980 the union and the company embarked on
a jointly administered quality of working life (QWL) experiment,
prior to the shift in business strategy by the company.
The implementation of this new business strategy in the context
of an industrial relations system characterized by centralized
bargaining, union-management cooperation, and an evolving QWL process
led to the following events between 1981 and mid-1983. Large scale
layoffs shrunk the bargaining unit by approximately 25%. The QWL
process expanded from a narrow quality circle focus to one that
examined ideas for altering the work organization in ways (structure
of jobs, work layout, job assignments and, team decision making) that
directly lowered costs and increased productivity. A new collective
bargaining agreement was signed in 1983 that broke the prior pattern
of regular wage and fringe benefit improvements by freezing wages in
the first year and increasing wages only one and two percent in the
second and third years respectively. In return, the union received a
no layoff commitment and a commitment from the company to maintain
the job base in Rochester and to continue to support and expand the
QWL process.
The Xerox case therefore is consistent with the proposition
that given increased competition from a maturing product market and a
strategic business decision to stay and compete in all segments of
the market on the basis of price, a firm necessarily must take steps
to lower costs and improve productivity. In the face of a commitment
to continued acceptance of the union, changes designed to lower labor
costs and improve productivity were implemented through collective
bargaining and through jointly administered changes in the
organization of work at the workplace that grew out of a cooperative
union management QWL process.
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The Tire Industry
The above examples illustrate ways in which corporate strategy
decisions both affect and are affected by industrial relations within
the firm. By looking at a single industry over time, however, it is
possible to illustrate more clearly the proposition that firms facing
the same environmental changes can vary in their business strategy
responses. These responses, in turn have differential consequences
for industrial relations in the various firms. Thus, we now briefly
examine variations in corporate responses to the same market changes
within a single industry, rubber tires.
Industrial Relations Background
The experience of the rubber tire industry parallels that of
similar manufacturing industries that have made up the "core" of
union strength in the U.S. The United Rubber Workers (URW) have
historically held a position of great power in the tire industry,
organizing virtually every plant, enforcing tight master agreements
within the industry, and both helping to set and enforce pattern
bargaining with powerful unions elsewhere (Eckstein and Wilson, 1963;
Maher, 1960). The industry then was dominated by four large
producers (Goodyear, Firestone, Goodrich, and Uniroyal) who together
accounted for 85 percent of industry sales. Competition within this
group was fierce, however, and was based on price competition and
efforts to increase market shares. Although the union had
effectively taken wage costs out of competition by completely
organizing the product market, the uncertainty caused by poor labor
relations was a continuing problem for the industry. There were
major strikes in thirteen out of seventeen rounds of negotiations
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between 1950 and 1979. At the plant level, shopfloor disputes were a
constant threat to disrupt production (Kuhn 1961). Developments in
the product market, however, would soon present opportunities for
diminishing the bargaining power of the workers, thereby eliminating
one of the main facillitating factors for those disputes.
Product Market Change
The key change in the product market began with the groTing
acceptance by consumers of higher-priced radial tires, a trend that
started with imports from companies such as Michelin and caught
domestic producers off guard. Direct cost competition from a
nonunion (therefore non pattern following) producer became a factor
in the 1970s when Michelin opened its U.S. manufacturing plant in
South Carolina. Radial tires rose from two percent of the market in
1970 to 55 percent by 1980. Since new equipment was needed to build
radial tires and meet that demand, domestic tire companies were
confronted with two options: They could retool existing bias tire
plants or build new radial plants. While retooling might a priori
seem to be the simpler route, building new plants had several
industrial relations advantages: the backlog of restrictive
practices and the climate of antagonism at the plant level could be
eliminated, and the plants could be opened on a nonunion basis.
The firms that chose to compete in this new market generally
pursued the option to build. Between 1970 and 1980, ten new radial
plants were constructed, all in the south. The union was able to
organize only two of the ten plants. The few bias plants that were
retooled were also in the south. Thus, union coverage of the
industry fell from 95 percent to 80 percent during the mid 1970's.
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Interfirm Variations in Business Strategies
By the mid-1970's, total demand for tires had declined,
partially because radial tires lasted longer but also because
imported cars cut into the demand for U.S. cars and tires. Further,
there were indications that low-cost, foreign tire makers might make
inroads directly into the U.S. domestic tire market. During this
period the four biggest companies each made business strategy
decisions that would change the long-run direction of their
operations, increase variability in the industry and, therefore, lead
to greater variability in industrial relations.
Goodyear, the industry leader in price and quantity, decided to
push to further dominate the market for tires. It would compete in
every market and would meet the foreign competition by price-cutting
(Business Week, 1982). Goodyear was in the best position to do this
because it had established in the early 1970's a new radial plant in
Lawton, Oklahoma that it successfully kept nonunion. In addition, a
significant portion of its capacity was off cycle with respect to the
pattern, e.g., Kelley Springfield. Goodyear also needed to automate
if it was to become the world price leader, and while it generally
was not threatening plants with shutdowns (it closed only two
plants), it was offering to enhance the security of their operations
by investing in plants -- but only in return for work rule
concessions. For example, Goodyear secured work rule concessions in
Topeka, in Gadsden, Alabama (for new radial operations), and in Akron
(for a new airspring plant) before any of this investment began.
Firestone decided that it could no longer hope to compete and
be a price leader in every tire market. It chose to consolidate its
operations, close off certain tire lines and emphasize those in which
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it could maintain a high market share (Business Week 1982).
Therefore, Firestone had the biggest employment rundown, closing five
plants after 1973, each with over 1,000 employees. It was also the
most successful at getting concessions at the plant level where it
implicitly played plants off against each other in an effort to get
them to cut costs. It was able to get concessions because the
shutdown threat was clearly credible and because Firestone was also
staying in the tire business; thus, there was some chance that
cost-cutting might save the plants.
Goodrich had begun a slow move away from the tire business some
years before by diversifying into other products. By 1985, Goodrich
planned to have only 40 percent of its business in tires. It decided
to withdraw further from the tire business, getting out of the
competitive market for original equipment and concentrating in a few
high-quality lines where volume was smaller. Unlike Firestone,
however, Goodrich was less successful in negotiating plant level
concessions since it had already consolidated much of its tire
operations and had fewer marginal tire plants left to play off
against each other. Furthermore, unlike Goodyear which depended on
the leverage and low costs of its nonunion and off cycle plants in
order to compete on price in all segments of the market, Goodrich
agreed in 1979 to a neutrality clause in organizing drives at any new
tire plants. This was a rather costless agreement since the
company's business strategy did not call for building any new tire
plants. Significantly, during the early 1970's when the other major
companies were adding non union capacity Goodrich did not follow
suit. As a result, it enjoyed the most amicable relations with the
URW during the 1970's but it also found itself unable to pursue a
high volume-low cost strategy.
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Uniroyal was in the worst financial position.' Having grown by
acquisition, it found itself competing in the full tire range but
without the volume or the modern low-cost plants to match
competitors' prices. Uniroyal moved close to bankruptcy and was
forced to cut losses and product lines quickly (Forbes, 1981). It
closed three of its five plants but was less able to obtain
concessions because of the pressure to cut its losses quickly.
The effects of these different business responses to new market
conditions were to produce plant-level variances in company master
agreements, to break up the uniformity of those agreements, and make
to them more specific to the circumstances in individual plants. The
decisions to consolidate productive capacity gave management a means
for securing changes in plant-level industrial relations where the
greatest problems had existed.
The different business strategies chosen by these firms also
had a clear influence on the outcome of national negotiations in
1979. The first development was that Firestone agreed to withdraw
from the industry's mutual aid pact in return for a no-strike,
no-lockout agreement and the promise to accept the industry
settlement. This action effectively abolished the mutual aid
agreement. The pact required, among other things, that the members
fill the orders of the struck firm's customers. This became
increasingly difficult to do as the firms began to pursue different
product lines and markets. With these changes, they were also less
in need of the protection offered by mutual aid pacts because they
were less in competition with each other.
-29-
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The second major change was the breaking of a "followership"
settlement pattern that had been established with the auto industry.
That pattern had been established and maintained largely because the
product market for tires was so closely tied to that for autos (labor
cost increases for original equipment tires could be passed on to new
car prices). Goodrich had been chosen by the union to set the
pattern agreement, but it had made a business decision previously to
get out of the competitive original equipment market and thus their
product link with the auto industry was broken. The terms of the
Goodrich settlement deviated significantly from the auto pattern, at
least in part because the protection offered by the product market
pattern had been broken.
In summary, industrial relations in the tire industry has
undergone significant changes in the past few years, changes that
have been driven directly by strategic business decisions made at the
corporate level. The overall decline of unionization, the decay of
uniform, multiplant contracts, the end of the mutual aid pact, the
break with the auto settlement, the breakdown of uniformity in the
industry agreement and the intensive efforts to change workrules to
achieve more flexible and lower cost work organization systems that
could compete with nonunion plants can all be traced to these
strategic business decisions. Moreover, variations across firms in
the size and types of concession agreements achieved also reflected
differences in the competitive strategies of each firm and the
markets in which they were trying to participate.
In this industry and in others like it, the important element
in industrial relations has not just been changes in the environment,
but diverse decisions made at the corporate level to adjust to a
, ,_ ., .. .,, .. ...  , ...'' 1'A ... '.' '" '' 
changing environment. Our thesis, which the rubber industry
illustrates, is that a complex interaction occurs between a more
demanding competitive environment and the shaping of key business
decisions -- at the same time, these factors are interacting with
industrial relations factors to produce more options and diversity.
Thus, a complete explanation of the changes in industrial relations
that have occurred among the firms in this and other industries
requires consideration of additional variables than those envisioned
within the traditional industrial relations systems type of analysis.
Strategic Choices of Labor and Government Actors
Although we stress the effects of managerial strategies in this
paper, under different environmental conditions either union or
government strategies could serve as the catalyst for change. The
theoretical argument developed here would apply equally to these
other actors. That is, should the economic and political environment
shift in ways that put unions in more powerful positions, there is no
reason to assume that the only union reaction would be a singular
effort to recoup their economic concessions at the bargaining table.
Instead, some unions may broaden their scope of interests and efforts
to seek more direct participation or influence in corporate strategic
decision-making and/or in worker participation processes at the
workplace. Some union leaders (Joyce, 1981) clearly recognize that
the future of the labor movement requires more active participation
in strategic decisions affecting worker interests that heretofore
have been left to management. Likewise, we have seen major changes
in the industrial relations policies and strategies of the current
Administration and there is good reason to believe that a
countervailing swing in government labor policies could occur if an
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Administration with closer ties to the labor movement were to be
elected. Thus, understanding the consequences of strategic choices
of all the key actors represents an important frontier for industrial
relations theory, and one that we have only begun to address in this
paper.
Finally, while we have stressed the dynamics set off by changes
in the environment which lead to changes in the top tier of strategic
decision making, other equally important environmental changes are
leading to new choices in the design of work systems at the bottom or
workplace tier of our framework. The rise of flexible work systems
(Piore, 1983; Walton, 1982; Kochan and Katz, 1983) in reponse to more
specialized product markets, new technologies, and behavioral science
innovations is currently leading to changes in the organization of
work and the structure of compensation and progression ladders in
both union and nonunion firms. Thus, future research needs to look
not only at the effects of strategic choices that filter down from
the top of organizations to affect collective bargaining and the
workplace, but also at changes at the workplace that have
implications for collective bargaining and higher levels of decision
making as well.
Implications for Future Research
This paper provides a preliminary sketch of the framework we
are developing to explain and interpret the changes that have been
occurring in the U.S. industrial relations system. A strategic
choice model has been presented in an effort to explain interfirm
variations in industrial relations practices at the levels of
corporate policy making, collective bargaining, and workplace
interactions. The framework supplements and modifies the concepts
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relied on by industrial relations systems theorists. Strategic
choice is not a complete substitute for the explanatory power of
environmental variations or changes, bargaining structures and
organizational characteristics but an important additional and
heretofore neglected intervening variable that is needed to help
explain the dynamics of industrial relations systems.
Further analysis is also needed to better document the
importance of values and ideology as explanatory variables
independent of market forces and strategic choices. It is clear, for
example, that the union avoidance preferences of American managers
are deeply rooted in their value systems and ideology (Bendix,
1956). Thus, the growth in union avoidance strategies or policies is
only partly explained by changes in the ability and the motivation of
employers to carry through on their preferences.
In future work we need to examine the inter-relationships among
strategies adopted at different levels of a firm. Two hypotheses we
plan to pursue more fully are that: (1) instability is more likely
when internal contradictions (Kochan and McKersie, 1983) exist among
the strategies followed across the three levels within a firm, and
(2) more significant and lasting changes occur when there is both
internal consistency in strategies at the three levels and a match
between the strategies of one actor (management) and the other actors
with which it deals (unions and the government). Another way to
state the issue is to contrast two prevalent profiles: Will more
stability occur in decentralized structures in which employers pursue
a union free strategy at the corporate level along with programs to
achieve labor management cooperation at the plant level, or in
centralized and highly unionized structures where management and
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labor search for a coherent and integrated strategy for shaping their
practices at all three levels of industrial relations? In the 1960s
and 1970s it appears that the decentralized and low unionized firms
adapted to increased competition steadily and gradually by opening
nonunion greenfield sites and by using comprehensive and innovative
personnel policies to reinforce their business objectives as well as
to further their union avoidance objectives. In contrast, the highly
centralized/highly unionized sector appeared to be rather static
during this time period with industrial relations occupying a more
isolated, defensive, or protected role within the firm. In the
1980s, however, the increased economic pressures facing these firms
shattered this stability leading some firms and unions to attempt to
restructure their relationships (as in autos, telephones and at
Xerox).
Further research will be needed to answer the questions just
posed and to transform the framework presented here into a more full
bodied theory complete with testable propositions. However, more is
at stake in this type of analysis than just the need to develop
better interpretative theory. If we are correct that fundamental
change is underway in the basic parameters of the U.S. industrial
relations system, then the strategic choices the parties make at this
critical moment in history will have profound and perhaps lasting
effects on the conduct and performance of our industrial relations
systems at the level of the firm as well as for society as a whole.
For these reasons we must meet the challenge of accurately
interpreting current developments in a way that helps better inform
practitioners and policy makers about the consequences of alternative
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Industrial Relations Strategy Matrix
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